




BURDEN OF PROOF: HOW INTERSECTIONALITY CAN 




People like order, and we find comfort in discerning patterns in objects 
or ideas that portray similar characteristics—it is the natural way to process 
information.  However, when done inartfully, classification can lead to eras-
ure and often happens when society tries to group people.  These classifica-
tions frequently mask the experiences of the people who exist in a subgroup 
of a larger category and result in overlooked needs of those intersectional 
minorities.  In the equal protection context, it can lead to disproportionate 
discrimination of subgroup members. 
Black1 LGBT people are an example of this phenomenon.  As the LGBT 
community continues its fight for equal protection, advocates have advanced 
several arguments to analogize the LGBT struggle to other, officially recog-
nized, “protected classes.”2  One particularly effective argument has been the 
comparison between the civil rights struggles of Black Americans in the 
1950s–80s to the current fight for civil rights faced by LGBT Americans.  
However, while this argument has proven to be persuasive to many, it has 
also created a perceived dichotomy between the Black and LGBT commu-
nities.  This, in turn, has subordinated the identity of Black LGBT people by 
 
 * J.D., 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  B.A., B.S., 2013, University of Alabama.  I 
am sincerely grateful to the generous and thoughtful guidance I received from Professor Tobias 
Wolff that made this comment possible.  Additional thanks to my Journal colleagues for their feed-
back during the writing process, and to George and Jeannette Arroyo for their unyielding support. 
 1 This Comment uses the terms “Black” and “person of color.”  These phrases are not used inter-
changeably.  The term “Black” refers to the specific racial minority of Americans, which does not 
necessarily include recent immigrants from African countries.  When referring to “person of color,” 
this Comment includes Hispanic/Latinos, African/Black Americans, Asian Americans, and other 
racial minorities.  The latter term is used primarily when there is insufficient sociological research 
on the specific Black population for a given fact, statistic, or situation. 
 2 In this Comment, “protected class” refers to a racial, social, political, sexual, or gender-based group 
that the Supreme Court has recognized as deserving a heightened form of scrutiny.  See infra Part I.A. 
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typecasting the general LGBT community as analogous to, but distinct from, 
the Black community. 
By subordinating this subgroup in popular rhetoric, we lose the oppor-
tunity to fully understand (1) the problems facing the larger Black and LGBT 
community, and (2) the way in which intersectional groups are affected by 
larger power structures, which can also highlight the aspects of the law that 
are problematic to the two subordinated classes to which the intersectional 
group belongs.  This is particularly true of the current debate surrounding 
the LGBT community, equal protection, and heightened standards of scru-
tiny. 
While many scholars discuss the importance of extending some form of 
heightened scrutiny to the LGBT community,3 these articles predominantly 
discuss the negative effects of the current standard of scrutiny in the context 
of the LGBT community as a whole.  The social sciences also devote signifi-
cant commentary to the equally important issue of how race and sexuality 
intersect within the LGBT community,4 but there is relatively little discussion 
of how that intersection informs the heightened scrutiny debate.5  Unfortu-
nately, this avoidance leads to the further marginalization of LGBT minori-
ties and can delay the ultimate goal of LGBT equality.6 
This Comment unites these two bodies of scholarly work to highlight the 
problems of intent in the equal protection framework.  It will discuss the way 
 
 3 See, e.g., Nicholas Drew, A Rational Basis Review That Warrants Strict Scrutiny: The First Circuit’s Equal 
Protection Analysis  in Massachussetts v. Department of Health and Human Services,  54 B.C. L. 
REV. E. SUPP. 43, 52–56 (2013) (arguing that the First Circuit should have applied heightened 
scrutiny to discrimination against “homosexuals”); Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect 
Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 386–90 (2010) (calling on courts to apply heightened scrutiny 
to statutes that treat LGBTs differently); Mark Strausser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and 
Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 1021, 1027 (2011) (“Arguably, sexual orientation 
should be recognized as a classification triggering heightened scrutiny.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, It’s [Not] a Black Thing: The Black/Gay Split over Same-Sex Marriage—A 
Critical [Race] Perspective, 22 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 1, 8 (2013) (discussing how viewing the domi-
nant normative aspects of the identities of “blackness” and “gayness” as “straightness” and “white-
ness,” respectively, can subordinate the influences of the Black LGBT group); Russell K. Robinson, 
Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468–69 (2009) (situating the perspective of Black “men 
who have sex with men” in the broader context of HIV laws). 
 5 This may be the result of a rejection of intersectionality discussions by several prominent scholars 
in the field.  See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and 
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1365 (2000) (discussing the hesitation of schol-
ars such as Richard D. Mohr, Bruce Bawer, Marshall Kirk, and Hunter Madsen in applying an 
intersectional framework because such efforts are “wasteful” and that they “Balkanize” and hobble 
gay rights theory and activism). 
 6 See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1360 (explaining that a comparative approach to race and sexual 
orientation reflects a “broader marginalization of persons of color . . . who are excluded from es-
sentialist queer theories and politics.”). 
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in which a proposed Kansas statute, the Kansas CARE Act,7 would likely re-
sult in a greater disproportionate impact on Black LGBT couples than either 
heterosexual Black couples or white LGBT couples while still operating within 
the constitutionally appropriate boundaries of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Through this analysis, we see that Black LGBT people are ultimately left with-
out remedy under either strict scrutiny (as Black people) or rational basis plus 
(as LGBT people) because of the equal protection intent requirement. 
Part I explains current equal protection precedent for challenging a fa-
cially neutral law by (1) describing the general framework of heightened scru-
tiny surrounding suspect classifications and, (2) discussing the special rational 
basis plus analysis that the Court has often used in the LGBT context.  Part 
II provides a demographic snapshot of Black LGBT people in America, 
which will provide a basis for analysis when discussing the Kansas CARE 
program.  Part III applies Part II to a hypothetical equal protection challenge 
brought by a family harmed by the CARE program, highlighting the multi-
plicative negative effects the legislation would have on Black LGBT people.  
Finally, Part IV advocates for a modification of the intent requirement in 
equal protection jurisprudence in light of the difficulties presented. 
I.  CURRENT LGBT EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
At its core, the Equal Protection Clause protects each person from invid-
ious, discriminatory action by the state.8  Because laws necessarily recognize 
distinctions in the behaviors of different groups, not all equal protection 
claims are, in fact, created equal.  While legislative differentiation is a form 
of discrimination, it is “discrimination” as understood without the negative 
connotation with which the word is so often associated.9  As it is the purpose 
of legislatures to make these benign distinctions, they are deemed constitu-
tionally acceptable. 
In order to avoid tension with the fundamental legislative mandate to 
make distinctions and the Fourteenth Amendment’s goals of equality, the 
Equal Protection Clause functions as a proscription against any intention by 
the legislature to make impermissible differentiations.10  The following sections 
discuss how intent informs the traditional equal protection framework and 
the current rational basis plus review applied to LGBT people. 
 
 7 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/sb158. 
 8 Julie A. Greenberg, Unequal Protection for Sex and Gender Nonconformists, in CONTROVERSIES IN EQUAL 
PROTECTION CASES IN AMERICA: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 201, 205 (Anne 
Richardson Oakes ed., 2015). 
 9 Compare Discriminate, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017) (definition 1) (“[T]o serve 
to differentiate, to distinguish.”) with id. (definition 4) (“[T]o treat a person or group in an unjust or 
prejudicial manner, esp. on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.”).  
 10 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
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A.  Traditional Equal Protection Jurisprudence and Suspect Classifications 
Typically, a challenged law’s survival depends upon which level of scru-
tiny the court applies.11  As equal protection jurisprudence evolved, it became 
apparent that any classification seeking heightened scrutiny must be suffi-
ciently analogous to the paradigmatic case—race—to be afforded height-
ened scrutiny.12  In subsequent years, a handful of groups have been catego-
rized as “suspect” and have been granted different degrees of scrutiny as their 
situations relate to and differ from the paradigmatic case.  For example, 
courts recognize classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin 
as warranting strict scrutiny,13 while gender and illegitimacy warrant inter-
mediate scrutiny.14 
A court applying strict scrutiny is at its least deferential.  It requires the 
government to prove that a challenged law serves a compelling purpose that 
cannot be achieved through another, less discriminatory, means15 and is nar-
rowly tailored to avoid over- and under-inclusiveness.16  By contrast, the 
court’s least exacting form of inquiry—rational basis review—will presume a 
challenged law is constitutional17 and uphold the law as long so it is rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.18  This deference also allows 
significant over- and under-inclusiveness, which accepts certain uninten-
tional negative effects on certain groups in order to accomplish the legisla-
ture’s goal.  Intermediate scrutiny exists between the two extremes of rational 
 
 11 See Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Patterns of Congruence, 
Divergence and Judicial Deference, 16 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 591, 595 (1989) (“If strict scrutiny virtually 
insures that a statute will fail judicial review, and if application of the classic rational basis test yields 
the opposite result, then it would seem as if the Court’s only real ‘decision’ is about which standard 
to apply.”).  But cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in 
theory but fatal in fact.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995))); 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794–96 (2006) (questioning the notion that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact” 
while still recognizing that only about one third of laws survive the standard). 
 12 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976) (contrasting the severity and pervasiveness 
of discrimination against women and African Americans with the treatment of illegitimates); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973) (comparing the historic discrimination against 
and political power of women to that of African Americans). 
 13 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that racial classifications are subject to 
strict scrutiny); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general 
rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. . . . [T]hese 
laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.”). 
 14 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 15 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 687 (4th ed. 2011). 
 16 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
 17 ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 82 (2006). 
 18 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (discussing the equal protection framework in the context of illegitimacy); 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (low income); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (licensed vs. non-licensed opthamologists frame-fitting). 
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basis and strict scrutiny, and requires the government to show that a chal-
lenged law is substantially related to an important–though not compelling–
government purpose.19 
Notably, the legislature’s intent when passing the challenged law is a nec-
essary component of each level of scrutiny,20 and it is the plaintiff who bears 
the burden of proof.  In practice, this burden is frequently insurmountable.  
Legislators who avoid openly voicing their discriminatory desires can pass 
detrimental laws, because “[a]n inference drawn from congressional silence” 
is not credible when contrary to textual evidence.21  Even if some questiona-
ble statements are made on the legislative floor, the statements of a few leg-
islators within the legislative history are often insufficient proof that the ma-
jority of the governing body shared those beliefs because such statements 
cannot be imputed to the whole.22  And, in many instances, statistical evi-
dence of a significant disparate impact is insufficient to prove legislative in-
tent.23  With such high barriers, it can often become nearly impossible to 
prove intent.  As a result, many statutes that result in the subordination of 
certain classes withstand scrutiny. 
1.  Rational Basis Plus 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people have not been afforded 
heightened scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court24 and, as such, are 
subject to rational basis review.  Initially, when applying rational basis re-
view, the lack of heightened scrutiny for the LGBT community as a class 
seems concerning.  This level of review traditionally favors the government, 
as the Court has been explicit in its deference to the right of state and federal 
legislatures to make laws.25  Under rational basis, the actual purpose of the 
 
 19 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.1, at 687; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a drinking law that discriminated by gender). 
 20 See, e.g., Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
 21 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991). 
 22 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a 
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes 
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); S. Wine and Spirits of America, Inc. v. Div. of 
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an article that 
purports to explain one of the sponsors’ intentions for a particular bill were insufficient to impute 
to the whole). 
 23 Statistical disparities have been deemed insufficient in the context of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, which is derived from the Fifteenth Amendment, but is similarly scrutinized for intent.  See 
Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit’s Heightened Section 2 “Intentional 
Discrimination” Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 56–57 (2011). 
 24 See infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text. 
 25 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (declaring that “a state is free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy 
by legislation adapted to its purpose”); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 
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law need not be legitimate as long as there could be some legitimate purpose 
that is rationally related to the law’s enactment.26  In fact, the justification 
that a court uses to legitimate a particular law need not even be argued by 
the legislature, but can be hypothesized ex post by the Court itself.27 
Under this framework, homophobic and transphobic legislators could hy-
pothetically present a bill with a clear bias for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans 
persons, only to escape invalidation by providing an ex post, hypothetically 
legitimate purpose when confronted by the courts.  In practice, however, the 
Court has not applied such a minimal standard of review towards the LGBT 
class since Baker v. Nelson, which denied certiorari in a case appealing Minne-
sota’s denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 1972.28  Rather, the 
Court has created an unofficially recognized but frequently used standard 
referred to as “rational basis plus”29 or “rational basis with bite.”30  While the 
Court has explicitly declined to grant heightened scrutiny to many politically 
unpopular classes,31 it has nonetheless consistently probed the legislature’s 
actual purpose when enacting a challenged law that negatively affects such 
groups.32  The Supreme Court applies this standard in cases that challenge 
laws which disproportionately affect LGBT individuals. 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno was the Court’s first significant 
deviation from traditional rational basis review.33  The case questioned the 
 
(1952) (reiterating that the Court “do[es] not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of leg-
islation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare”). 
 26 See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88 (hypothesizing about why the Oklahoma legislature could have 
rationally determined that only ophthalmologists could reframe lenses). 
 27 Id. 
 28 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.) (dismissing for want of substantial federal question) dismissing appeal from 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).  While the Court also denied that there was a 
fundamental right implication in Bowers v. Hardwick, this argument was due process-based.  The 
equal protection claim was not preserved by the plaintiffs and was therefore not reviewed.  See 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201–02 (1986) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (disagreeing with the 
dismissal of the equal protection issue). 
 29 See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Gayffirmative Action: The Constitutionality of Sexual Orientation-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion Policies, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 755–56 (2015) (describing the nature and origins of rational 
basis plus review). 
 30 See, e.g., Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779–80 
(1987) (describing the evolution of rational basis “with bite” after the Supreme Court’s 1985 term, 
which invalidated four statutes under supposed rational basis review). 
 31 While the Court in Obergefell did reference Frontiero, Zablocki, and Loving in its equal protection justi-
fication, pointing perhaps to a possibility of a heightened scrutiny statute, it did not in fact apply a 
heightened scrutiny standard. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
 32 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973) (overturning a facially neutral 
law that negatively impacted “hippie communes”); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432 (declaring a municipal 
zoning law unconstitutional as applied to a home for the mentally handicapped); see also United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (overturning the Defense of Marriage Act as 
discriminatory against LGBT individuals). 
 33 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  In two previous cases, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty & Ins. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court applied a more substantial form of rational basis 
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constitutionality of an amendment to the Food Stamp Act, which barred non-
related persons living in the same household from receiving food stamps.34  
Under traditional rational basis review, the Government’s assertion that the 
amendment was enacted to minimize fraud in the Food Stamp program35 
should have been a sufficiently legitimate purpose to which the amendment 
was rationally related.  However, the Moreno majority rejected this claim and 
instead looked to the Act’s stated purpose and the legislative history surround-
ing the amendment to find the law’s true intent—discrimination against hip-
pies36—and disallowed a “bare congressional desire to harm a politically un-
popular group” as an illegitimate governmental interest.37 
Throughout the 1980s, the Court applied this more searching rational 
basis review to overturn a host of challenged laws.  For example, in Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court declined to apply intermediate scrutiny to 
the mentally handicapped but still declared a municipal zoning law uncon-
stitutional by using Moreno’s “politically unpopular group” language.38  This 
line of precedent was extended to the LGBT community in Romer v. Evans, a 
case in which the Court ruled unconstitutional a Colorado referendum seek-
ing to disallow anti-discrimination protection for LGBT persons.39  In de-
claring the law unconstitutional, the Court once again cited Moreno’s “politi-
cally unpopular group” language to hold that the law could not pass rational 
basis review because the government did not have a legitimate interest in 
denying these protections to a traditionally marginalized group.40  Moreover, 
the Court went far beyond the traditional requirements of rational basis re-
view by noting the law’s simultaneous over- and under-inclusivity,41 probing 
the legislature’s actual animosity towards LGBT people, and dismissing the 
Government’s argument that it had a legitimate interest in ensuring citizens 
the freedom to associate.42 
Almost a decade later, the Court became more explicit in its intention to 
apply a skeptical rational review in LGBT-related challenges.  In Lawrence v. 
Texas, which overturned a Texas anti-sodomy law on due process and equal 
protection grounds, Justice O’Connor stated that for laws harming politically 
 
review, but these cases are often seen as transitional moves towards rational basis plus.  See Nicholas, 
supra note 29, at 756. 
 34 413 U.S. at 529. 
 35 Id. at 533, 535. 
 36 Id. at 534. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
 39 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 40 Id. at 634–35. 
 41 Id. at 633. 
 42 Id. at 634–35. 
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unpopular groups, “a more searching form of rational basis” is applied.43  Fi-
nally, in United States v. Windsor in 2013,  which struck down the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and Obergefell v. Hodges, which overturned the Ohio, Tennes-
see, Michigan, and Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriage, the Court 
ignored plaintiffs’ arguments to extend intermediate scrutiny to LGBT peo-
ple while simultaneously scrutinizing the legitimacy of the law.44 
Undoubtedly, the Court’s less deferential rational basis plus has served as 
an important vehicle in the advancement of LGBT rights.  However, the 
framework retains the same problematic standard as all other levels of scru-
tiny: it is the plaintiff who first bears the burden of proving legislative intent.  
As previously discussed, the Moreno court noted the existing legislative history 
showed a clear intent to prevent hippies from receiving food stamps,45 and 
Cleburne relied on the zoning board’s admission that the ordinance was passed 
in response to the community’s “negative attitudes” towards people with in-
tellectual disabilities as proof of an illegitimate legislative intent.46  In the 
LGBT context, Romer,47 Lawrence,48 and Windsor49 all noted the existence of 
an impermissible desire to harm LGBT people either in the legislative history 
or on the face of the legislation. 
Post Obergefell, this intent requirement will likely continue to pose a diffi-
cult barrier for the advancement of LGBT people.  With legislatures on no-
tice that it is now impermissible to discriminate against LGBT people on the 
face of legislation, it is likely that these bodies will be more careful in disguis-
ing intent in legislative history and resort to the same facially-neutral lan-
guage that has proven effective in thwarting equal protection cases in the 
race context.50  More troublingly, this discrimination may also intersect with 
 
 43 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 44 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2608 (2015); cf. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184–85 (2d. Cir. 2012) (applying interme-
diate scrutiny to the Defense of Marriage Act after comparing LGBT persons to women). 
 45 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 46 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,  473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
 47 517 U.S. at 631 (looking at statutory language to determine that the law, on its face, “imposes a 
special disability upon [LGBT] persons alone.”). 
 48 539 U.S. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (noting that, aside from criminalizing one particular 
type of sexual conduct that effectively “brands all homosexuals as criminals,” Texas had in the past 
stipulated that its anti-sodomy law “legally sanctions discrimination against homosexuals in a vari-
ety of ways.”). 
 49 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95 (looking to the legislative history, text of statute, and name of the Act to 
discover the purpose). 
 50 Indeed, North Carolina’s HB2, colloquially referred to as the “Bathroom Bill,” is but one recent 
example of this shift.  The bill has been widely decried as having the practical effect of both stig-
matizing trans people and foreclosing safe access to restrooms for trans people.  See GAVIN YAMEY, 
DUKE GLOBAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, POLICY BRIEF: HOW HB2 THREATENS THE HEALTH OF 
NORTH CAROLINIANS, 2–4 (2016), https://globalhealth.duke.edu/sites/default/files/policybrief-
how_hb2_threatens_the_health_of_north_carolinians.pdf.  However, the bill’s stated purpose is to 
provide businesses with “consistent statewide laws and obligations.”  H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 
2d Extra Sess., 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3.  
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other types of discrimination—i.e. race, class, gender, etc.—to create multi-
plicative layers of discriminations for these subgroups. 
II.  RACE, LAW, & BLACK LGBT FAMILIES 
As previously mentioned, this comment evaluates the potential equal pro-
tection challenges to a hypothetical foster care law that, without directly elim-
inating same-sex couples as candidates, would negatively and disproportion-
ately affect the group.  This hypothetical legislation is modeled after proposed 
Kansas Senate Bill No. 158, commonly referred to as the Kansas CARE Act, 
which sought to enact a new CARE family program for fostering families in 
early 2015.51 
The Act is a prime case study to analyze an equal protection challenge.  If 
enacted, CARE would likely exclude most LGBT people from a Kansas foster 
care placement program designed to provide greater monetary support and 
parental discretion.  It would also disproportionately harm potential Black 
foster care families.  However, this law would be multiplicatively harmful to 
Black LGBTs, who, because of current precedent surrounding intent, would 
be unable to challenge this law either on the basis of race or sexual orientation. 
Also, unlike other laws that could also be challenged under other federal 
legistion, the Fourteenth Amendment would likely provide the only avenue 
of relief.52  While the federal government does pass legislation that affects 
state foster care systems, the current federal framework is limited primarily 
to creating funding incentives which ensure that foster care programs exist 
in each state and that there are adequate measures in place to prevent child 
abuse.53  These laws provide significant leeway for the state legislatures to 
determine the ways in which the federal laws are implemented in their indi-
vidual states and often allow states to choose whether to opt into federal pro-
grams.54  As such, foster care law is particularly well-suited to serve as a case 
 
 51 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015). 
 52 When the CARE Act was under consideration, Congress was considering the Equality Act, H.R. 
3185, 114th Cong. (2015), which would amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include sex, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity among the prohibited categories of discrimination or segregation 
in places of public accommodation.  If enacted, the Equality Act could have provided another 
avenue of redress for potential litigation.  For the purpose of this comment, I intend to focus on a 
law that is entirely within the purview of a state’s jurisdiction.  The Kansas Act Against Discrimi-
nation, which is the state’s main anti-discrimination legislation, does not protect against discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a)(1)–(9) (2012). 
 53 Anne Lacquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 267, 286–90 (2009) (discussing the current framework of laws surrounding foster care). 
 54 See THE CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH CHILD 
PROTECTION,  CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION, 1 (2015) (“The primary responsibility for child 
welfare services rests with the States. Each State has its own legal and administrative structures and 
programs that address the needs of children and families.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, THE CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT: 40 YEARS OF 
SAFEGUARDING AMERICA’S CHILDREN 12–13 (2014) (discussing the financial incentives granted 
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study for an equal protection argument because they are unlikely to be re-
solved through federal legislative means that can create non-constitutional 
rights of action.55 
Many scholars have already written on the problematic nature of the dis-
parate impact faced by LGBT families.  What is often overlooked, however, 
is how LGBT families of color—particularly Black LGBT families—would 
disproportionately experience this disparate impact.  The disproportionately 
negative outcome facing these particular families deserves to be considered 
in the general discussion of why such laws are problematic.  The next sub-
section will provide an academic, demographic snapshot of Black LGBT 
families in order to provide necessary context when considering the potential 
discriminatory impact of the CARE Act and how such laws cause a greater 
negative effect on both the Black and LGBT communities as a whole than 
may have otherwise been thought. 
A.  Situating Black LGBT Families into the Broader Black & LGBT Family Dynamic 
1.  A Brief Note on Intersectionality 
Before delving into the Black LGBT family framework, it is important to 
first highlight the way in which this comment discusses that intersectional 
group.  Intersectionality is the overarching idea that social identities “are or-
ganizing features of social relationships, and how these social identities mu-
tually constitute, reinforce, and naturalize one other.”56  This can be under-
stood as both an individual experience, as a way to better understand the 
interdependent nature of greater societal power structures,57 or to focus par-
ticularly on those with multiple subordinate statuses (i.e., Black feminist the-
ory).58  This comment uses an intersectional framework to focus on two sub-
ordinated statuses—those who are both Black and LGBT—to highlight the 
multifaceted discrimination likely to be faced by this particular group in the 
context of a proposed bill as a way to better understand the governmental 
power affecting both the Black and LGBT communities as wholes.59 
 
to states in exchange for general increased state-based legislation and enforcement, as well as ex-
plaining the varying degrees of  state participation in the program). 
 55 Cf. Equality Act, H. R. 3185, 114th Cong., (2015) (proposing an amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 56 Leah R. Warner & Stephanie A. Shields, The Intersections of Sexuality, Gender, and Race: Identity Research 
at the Crossroads 68 SEX ROLES 803, 803–4 (2013). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (recognizing the inherent problem with ignor-
ing intragroup differences and how those tensions create greater marginalization for the internally 
marginalized within a particular group). 
 59 Due to the availability of research on the subject, this comment primarily focuses on Black lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual families.  However, some of the relied upon studies focus generally on families of 
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Until relatively recently, the Black LGBT experience has been largely 
overlooked in the discourse of LGBT equality.60  This erasure has many root 
causes, including the staffing of advocacy groups, tokenization, and hostility 
to intersectionality in either traditionally Black or queer “safe spaces,”61 but 
is often attributed to the LGBT movement’s early comparison of its struggle 
to the civil rights struggle of Black Americans in the 1950s–80s.62  This con-
troversial comparison became the focal point for people who disparaged the 
comparison as disrespectful and inappropriate,63 and continues to be an im-
portant comparison in today’s legal discourse.64  This comparison has cre-
ated a dichotomy of sorts between the “Black experience” and the “LGBT 
experience.”65  Recognizing the intersectional identities of Black LGBT peo-
ple is necessary to deconstruct the stereotype that the LGBT community is 
primarily affluent, well-educated, and white.66  Contrary to this popular ste-
 
color, which incorporate other groups who have experiences distinct from the general “Black 
LGBT” identity that are not fully considered in this comment. 
 60 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal 
Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1363 (2000) (“[I]ntersectionality has addressed pri-
marily, if not exclusively, the synergistic relationship between patriarchy and racial subordina-
tion.”). 
 61 Ashleigh Shackelford, The Politics of Erasure: Too Queer to Be Black, Too Black to Be Queer, FOR 
HARRIET, http://www.forharriet.com/2015/12/the-politics-of-erasure-too-queer-to-
be.html#axzz43aERxHIh (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing the erasure of the Black queer 
person in different spaces) . 
 62 See SEAN CAHILL & SARAH TOBIAS, POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER FAMILIES [hereinafter POLICY ISSUES] 27–28 (2007) (describing the efforts of the 
religious right for the past two decades as “pitting gay people against people of color” by construct-
ing a narrative of “special rights” that are compared to civil rights). 
 63 Id.; Karen Bates, African Americans Question Comparing Gay Rights Movement to Civil Rights, NPR (July 2, 
2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=419554758 
(highlighting the differences between the LGBT movement and the Black civil rights movement); 
Paul Brandeis Raushenbush, African-American vs. Gay Civil Rights Is a False Choice, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 20, 2014, 9:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-raushenbush/african-american-
gay-civil-rights_b_5353878.html. 
 64 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2636 n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (outlining the 
history of slavery and anti-miscegenation laws as an “offensive and inaccurate” comparator to mar-
riage equality); Brief of the Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 36–37, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 
14-574) (comparing the continued discrimination of the LGBT community to anti-miscegenation 
laws). 
 65 See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1365 (noting the main criticisms of intersectional theory in this 
arena as wasteful and likely to “hobble ‘gay rights’ theory”); THE NEW BLACK (California Newsreel 
2013) (discussing the negative political consequences of comparing the Black civil rights movement 
to LGBT civil rights struggles) . 
 66 See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1378 (“The theoretical backdrop to anti-gay and lesbian rights 
discourse is an image of gays and lesbians as a “wealthy, white, privileged class, who, unlike tradi-
tional ‘minorities,’ do not merit legislative civil rights protection or heightened judicial review of 
their claims of governmental discrimination.”). 
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reotype, non-white people are more likely to identify as LGBT when com-
pared to their white peers.67  The lifestyles of LGBT people of color—
whether they are Black, Latino, Hispanic, or Asian—are quantitatively and 
qualitatively distinct from the affluent white stereotype and can create either 
additive or multiplicative challenges on the individual with that intersecting 
identity.68  A failure to include these intersectional voices in depictions and 
understandings of what it means to be an LGBT person, in turn fails to con-
sider how the impact of certain legislation will impact a large portion of the 
LGBT population.69 
2.  A Demographic Snapshot 
With this background in mind, we can now situate Black LGBT (BLGBT) 
families within the larger framework of both Black and LGBT Americans.  
As a general, preliminary matter, many BLGBT people more readily associ-
ate with their racial identity as opposed to their sexuality.  There are many 
reasons for this, but a predominant reason is that this group reports finding 
a greater sense of community within Black communities than within LGBT 
communities.70  Also, for many BLGBT people, self-interest is linked to race.  
This often leads to a belief that equates making decisions that are “good for 
the race” to what is good for the BLGBT individual and/or that individual’s 
family.71  This is particularly true for young BLGBTs, who often balk at the 
tokenism in predominantly white LGBT spaces72 and who recognize that the 
visual immutability of skin color creates camaraderie in protesting racial is-
sues—for example, joining alongside other Black youth to protest police bru-
tality—in a way that their sexuality does not.  In contrast, more than half of 
BLGBT parents believe the LGBT community does not address their pri-
mary concerns: economic and racial injustice, and equality.73 
 
 67 Gary J. Gates and Frank Newport, Special Report: 3.4% of Adults Identify as LGBT, GALLUP (Oct. 18, 
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-lgbt.aspx (showing 
that while 4.6% of Blacks, 4.0% of Hispanics, and 4.3% of Asians identified as LGBT, only 3.2% 
of whites did, which was found to be statistically significant in spite of the larger general population 
of white Americans). 
 68 See Warner, supra note 56, at 804 (explaining the effects of systems of inequality on individuals with 
multiple subordinate statuses). 
 69 Mignon R. Moore, Articulating a Politics of (Multiple) Identities: LGBT Sexuality and Inclusion in Black 
Community Life, 7 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 315, 316 (2010). 
 70 Id. at 318. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See, e.g., Shackelford, supra note 61 (discussing her experiences attending queer spaces as a Black 
woman). 
 73 MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., LGBT FAMILIES OF COLOR: FACTS AT A GLANCE 
5 (2012). 
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For these reasons, as well as other societal factors that segregate communi-
ties by race,74  Black LGBT families are highly likely to remain in Black com-
munities and observe a majority of the community’s norms.  However, despite 
the desire to connect with the Black community, it is an unfortunate but per-
sistent fact that Black communities are more likely to resist LGBT equality and 
their family members living as openly gay, lesbian, bisexual, or trans.75  Often, 
this conversation is couched within religion, the idea of traditional family val-
ues, and the general repression of open discussions of sexuality.76 
Traditionally, much of the Black community revolves around the Black 
Christian Church.  For many, if not most, the Church is the center of infor-
mation, education, and resources, and the necessity of that community is of-
ten prioritized above other desires or needs.77  Whether social or professional, 
it is typically an ever-present force within all-Black gatherings.  And while 
many churches have aggressively fought for gay rights, and many more have 
come forward in opposition to government intervention harming LGBT in-
dividuals without supporting the “lifestyle,”78 there still remains a large por-
tion of the Black community that wholly rejects the LGBT community and 
family members who identify with it.79  Moreover, among the many Black 
people who do accept their LGBT family members, same-sex attraction is 
still considered a vice that should be managed or not discussed out of fear 
that it may “confuse the children,”80 which can cause many Black LGBT 
families and youth to feel isolated and suppress their identities.81  This, in 
turn, causes many BLGBT people to remain closeted for fear of rejection and 
perpetuates the group’s erasure. 
Moving to family dynamics, it is first important to note that while the 
perceived typical or stereotypical household model is a (married), two-parent 
household with children, less than 25% of American families comport with 
 
 74 Alexander Kent & Thomas C. Frohlich, The 9 Most Segregated Cities In America, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 27, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-9-most-segregated-cities-in-
america_us_55df53e9e4b0e7117ba92d7f (explaining how federal segregationist policies in the 
1930s, as well as the disproportionate economic fallout on Black communities, have perpetuated a 
cycle of segregated zip codes). 
 75 See Tonyia M. Rawls, Yes, Jesus Loves Me, in BLACK SEXUALITIES: PROBING POWERS, PASSIONS, 
PRACTICES, AND POLICIES 327 (Juan Battle & Sandra L. Barnes, eds. 2010) (discussing the ostra-
cization of Black LGBT people by the community). 
 76 THE NEW BLACK (California Newsreel 2013) (discussing how church discourse framed the Black 
conversation about LGBT issues). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Moore, supra note 69, at 317 (describing the greater degree of express disapproval of homosex-
uality and its perceived immorality). 
 80 THE NEW BLACK, supra note 76, at 33:42. 
 81 Id. 
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this family structure.82  While many Black families do conform to the stereo-
typical model, a larger percentage of Black households live with extended 
family in networked family structures.83  While all groups have extended fam-
ilies that they love and support in many ways, a networked structure is dis-
tinct from the stereotypical household model because of the normalcy and 
disproportionate degree of care and accepted responsibility towards non-
spouses or -children.  Network families accept and supply levels of responsi-
bility and support to the entire system as commonly and as normally as do 
parents towards their children in the stereotypical family structure.  As Black 
LGBT people are more likely to remain in their racial communities, the like-
lihood of being a member of a networked structure similarly increases. 
Networked families increase the likelihood of a range of responsibilities 
for any LGBT person of color.84  In addition to any biological children, Black 
LGBTs are more likely to have the additional responsibility of parenting 
other children within their network, including siblings, nieces and nephews, 
or grandchildren.85  This in turn creates a unique assortment of housing, eco-
nomic, and health concerns.86  Importantly, this also creates unique obstacles 
in the legal sphere, as most of the policies which govern family life define 
“family” as the stereotypical framework.87 
Despite struggles with acceptance, BLGBT families play a significant role 
within this framework and are actively involved in the creation of diverse and 
healthy Black families.88  Overall, “an estimated 2 million children are being 
raised in LGBT families,” and this figure is expected to increase in coming 
years.89  Black same-sex couples, in particular, are more likely to raise chil-
dren than their white peers.90  Sixty percent of Black female same-sex house-
holds include a parenting mother, which is nearly the same rate as married 
heterosexual couples.91  As of the 1990 census, 5% of partnered gay/bisexual 
men had children in their households.92 
People of color are also more likely to be foster parents.93  Currently, 
there are more than half a million children in the United States foster care 
 
 82 Family Recognition, NATIONAL BLACK JUSTICE COALITION, http://www.nbjc.org/issues/family-
recognition (last visited May 21, 2017). 
 83 Sean Cahill et. al., Partnering, Parenting and Policy: Family Issues Affecting Black Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender (LGBT) People, 6 RACE AND SOC’Y 85, 87 (2003) [hereinafter Partnering].  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 POLICY ISSUES, supra note 62, at 7. 
 88 MICHELE K. LEWIS & ISIAH MARSHALL, LGBT PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES AND 
PEOPLE OF AFRICAN DESCENT 123 (2012). 
 89 MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 2. 
 90 Id. 
 91 LEWIS & MARSHALL, supra note 88, at 123. 
 92 See Partnering, supra note 83, at 88. 
 93 MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3. 
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system, with over 100,000 of those children awaiting adoption.94  Approxi-
mately 14,100 children live with a lesbian or gay foster parent, which repre-
sents around 3% of total foster children.95  More than half of these same-sex 
couples are people of color.96 
Unfortunately, the high rate of fostering within Black LGBT communi-
ties is plagued with significant difficulties.  While same-sex foster parents gen-
erally have the highest levels of education,97 that statistic changes when look-
ing only at Black same-sex families or same-sex families of color.  For 
example, Black LGBT families are statistically less likely to have higher de-
grees of education and are more likely to struggle financially, with 32% of 
Black male same-sex couples and 28% of Black female families living in pov-
erty.98  The children raised in these families are also more likely to face the 
double discrimination of color and sexuality when going to school.99 
These families also face restricted access to health insurance.100  In many 
states where the majority of health insurance is provided by employers, Blacks 
are underrepresented in the percentage of employer-provided healthcare.101  
This reduced access to preventative and routine care has led to higher rates 
of disease and illness.102  Additionally, until very recently, many states have 
refused to require the extension of benefits to LGBT partners (and only now 
extend to married couples).103  Many LGBT families must purchase more ex-
pensive private insurance, which is a main underlying cause for why a dispro-
portionate percentage of LGBT people go without healthcare.104  Combining 
these two factors, Black LGBT families will likely continue to have dispropor-
tionately lower rates of healthcare, as the newly recognized marriage right will 
 
 94 Gary J. Gates et al., Adoption and Foster Care by Gay and Lesbian Parents in the United States, THE 
WILLIAMS INST. & URBAN INST. (2007), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tion/46401/411437-Adoption-and-Foster-Care-by-Lesbian-and-Gay-Parents-in-the-United-
States.PDF. 
 95 Id. at 15. 
 96 MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3. 
 97 Gates et al., supra note 94, at 11. 
 98 MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3. 
 99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102  While the CDC explains that preventative healthcare helps to “avoid or delay the onset of disease 
[and] keep diseases...from becoming worse or debilitating,” only about half of Americans use pre-
ventative services at the recommended rate.  Those who underuse or forego preventative services 
are those Americans “experiencing social, economic, or environmental disadvantages.”  CDC, Pre-
ventive Health Care, (June 12, 2013), https://www.cdc.gov/healthcommunication/toolstem-
plates/entertainmented/tips/preventivehealth.html.  
103  Tara Siegel Bernard, Fate of Domestic Partner Benefits in Question After Marriage Ruling, N.Y. TIMES: 
YOUR MONEY (June 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/your-money/fate-of-do-
mestic-partner-benefits-in-question-after-marriage-ruling.html. 
104 MOVEMENT ADVNCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 73, at 3. 
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still require higher rates for what are now pre-existing conditions that may not 
have been present when the family was first created. 
These struggles become more complex when they are recognized within 
the broader context of Black family life.  As previously discussed, many Black 
families operate as networked families that include extended relatives.  Isola-
tion and rejection from family results in diminished opportunities of support 
with all groups, but has a greater likelihood of occurring in families where 
older generations provide primary supportive roles.  Across races, acceptance 
of LGBT family members decreases as the age of the non-LGBT family 
member increases, which can cause added stress and increase the likelihood 
of rejection in these families.  Families concerned about ‘non-ideal’105 living 
arrangements for children may be less likely to support the same-sex family 
members within their network, which in turn can lead to a lack of emotional 
and financial support that can prevent otherwise interested potential parents 
from fostering.106 
This outcome is particularly alarming when looking at the rates of Black, 
LGBT, and BLGBT children currently waiting for placement within the fos-
ter care system.  Approximately 24% of girls and 10% of boys aging out of 
the foster care system reported a sexual orientation other than heterosex-
ual.107  Black children are also overrepresented in the system—24% of chil-
dren in foster care are Black,108 even as Blacks represent only 13.3% of the 
overall population109—likely resulting from racist policies that remove Black 
children from their families at disproportionate rates when compared to their 
white peers for similar behavior.110  As a combined identity, Black LGBT 
youth face constant, multifaceted struggles, including school bullying, lack of 
 
105 The quoted phrase is used to depict the type of language used by some in older generations who 
disapprove of LGBT sexual identities—not as an appropriate or correct characterization of LGBT 
people. 
106 Successful integration into life activities, of which fostering is one, requires, or is at least enhanced 
by, certain factors. See Yvette Taylor, Complexities and Complications: Intersections of Class and Sexuality, 
in THEORIZING INTERSECTIONALITY AND SEXUALITY 50 (Yvette Taylor, et. al., eds. 2011) (de-
scribing the requirement of capital and familial territory as influential factors in being a successful 
“out” person). 
107 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, SUPPORTING YOUR LGBT YOUTH: A GUIDE FOR 
FOSTER PARENTS 4 (May 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/LGBTQyouth.pdf. 
108 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2014, 9 (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf. 
109 U.S. Census Quick Facts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
110 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE, at vii (2002) 
(discussing the systems which remove Black children from their families through inferior treat-
ment). 
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acceptance within the home, physical abuse, and damaging ideologies that 
diminish personal autonomy and self-worth.111 
While there are a handful of specialized group home living options for 
LGBT youth that respect and allow the foster children to express their iden-
tities, most are found in large metropolitan areas, and none can possibly 
manage the thousands of LGBT youth that are currently in the foster care 
system.112  Black, LGBT, and BLGBT youth would be well served by States 
who increase foster care opportunities with families who understand their 
unique needs.  Laws that disincentivize BLGBT couples from providing an 
accepting foster care environment to these particular children harm these 
children regardless of whether those laws could be, in theory, rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government purpose. 
B.  Kansas Senate Bill No. 158 – CARE Family Program 
With this framework in mind, we turn to the illustrative legislation: the 
suggested Kansas CARE program for foster parents.  In early 2015, the Kan-
sas Senate Judiciary Committee proposed a substantial addition to the state’s 
foster care program.113  The recommended program would dramatically in-
crease the monetary compensation for CARE-approved families in relation 
to all other foster parents114 and would provide CARE parents significant 
autonomy over where and how the child will be educated.115  To be qualified 
for such benefits, however, a CARE family applicant would have to conform 
to the following criteria.  The family must have: 
(1) [Been a married]116 team for at least seven years, in a faithful, loving and 
caring relationship and with no sexual relations outside of the marriage; 
(2) submit[ted] to a background check on the [married couple]; 
(3) no current use of tobacco by anyone in the family’s home; 
(4) no history of unlawful drug use by anyone in the family’s home; 
 
111 See generally Benjamin Ashley, The Challenge of LGBT Youth in Foster Care, 1 TENN. STUDENT L. J. 47, 
63 (2014) (calling for protections against harassment and bullying faced by LGBT youth in foster 
care). 
112 Id. at 62–63 (recognizing the specialized group efforts of organizations like Green Chimneys in 
New York City, Gay and Lesbian Adolescent Social Services or “G.L.A.S.S.” in Oakland, Califor-
nia, and the Waltham House in Massachusetts). 
113 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015). 
114 Id. § 1(d)(4) (“The secretary shall pay each CARE family at a rate substantially higher than that of 
other foster care homes.”). 
115 Id. § 1(f)(1) (“a CARE family shall determine how best to meet the educational needs of any child 
placed with the family and shall have sole discretion in the educational placement of the child. . . . 
The secretary shall reimburse the CARE family for educational expenses incurred for each child 
who is not enrolled in a school district . . . .”). 
116 The following criteria are pulled directly from the proposed legislation.  In light of Obergefell v. 
Hodges, it would be unlikely that any such legislation would use the “husband” and “wife” charac-
terization for married persons, and so for the purposes of the hypothetical legislation in this com-
ment, I have changed the wording accordingly. 
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(5) no alcoholic liquor or cereal malt beverages in the family’s home; 
(6) both [parties to the marriage] have attained at least a high school diploma 
or equivalent; 
(7) [at least one of the married adults], or both, does not work outside the home; 
[and] 
(8) the family is involved in a social group larger than the family that meets reg-
ularly, preferably at least weekly.117 
S.B. 158’s purported goal is to “avoid additional trauma to the [foster] 
children and give them a traditional home environment during the time they 
are in foster care.”118  Senator Forrest Knox, the bill’s architect, championed 
the proposed legislation as an initial step to revolutionize the Kansas foster 
care program to incentivize “normal” families to enter the foster care sys-
tem.119  Eventually, the Senator hoped that the CARE program would re-
place current foster care criteria.120  In light of Obergefell, the Kansas Senate 
has held the bill, whose original language used “married man and woman” 
rather than married couple.  However, the bill still presents a particularly apt 
example of the type of legislation that an LGBT family could encounter in 
the near future. 
This legislation, and legislation like it, would have an obvious disparate 
impact on the LGBT community in Kansas.  Obergefell v. Hodges, which ex-
tended the fundamental marriage right to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, 
is only two years old.  As Kansas did not recognize same-sex marriages before 
this decision,121 almost all same-sex couple applicants would fail to meet the 
first criteria for CARE program parents.  While it is possible that some same-
sex applicants lived in one of the very few states that recognized same-sex 
 
117 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(1)–
(8) (Kan. 2015).  The bracketed changes reflect an attempt to ensure that the bill’s language is 
grammatically correct and reflects the ability of gay and lesbian couples to be considered married 
in Kansas, which did not appear to be contemplated in this bill. 
118 Joshua Vail, Knox Seeking to Pilot New Class of Foster Families, THE CHANUTE TRIBUNE, Feb.  17, 
2015, http://www.chanute.com/news/article_411f1820-b71f-11e4-acd5-3733c02c96d7.html 
[hereinafter Foster Families] (discussing the testimony of 114th District Senator Forrest Knox at the 
Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee meeting about the purpose of S.B. 158). 
119 Bryant Lowry, Kansas Bill Would Reward Foster Parents Who Are Married, Faithful, and Alcohol-Free, THE 
WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/arti-
cle9711821.html.  Specifically, the Senator promoted the bill because “we need more normal 
homes as foster homes.  And how do you get normal?  When I say normal, I just mean an ordinary 
home with a mom and dad who loves [sic] the kids. . . . It’s no secret I’d like to see church people.  
In Chanute, Kansas, there’s no synagogue.  It’s church people.” Id. 
120 Id. 
121 State of Kansas, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA, http://www.marriageequality.org/region_kansas (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
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marriage for more than seven years,122 this criteria would still disproportion-
ately affect same-sex couples. 
Moreover, the social and economic position of BLGBT people123 would 
result in this legislation doubly affecting these families.  As previously dis-
cussed, BLGBT couples are more likely to have networked families and so 
are less likely to be married than their white peers and thus.  Additionally, 
because of the heighted hostility towards LGBT people in Black communi-
ties, open BLGBT couples are more likely to be ostracized from their families 
and church communities, making them less likely to be a part of “a social 
group larger than the family that meets regularly, preferably at least weekly,” 
as required by the eighth criterion.124  Finally, due to the myriad issues relat-
ing to healthcare costs, familial responsibilities, and general access to educa-
tion, BLGTB couples are less likely than both Black heterosexuals and White 
LGBT people to have the financial freedom to allow one spouse to stay at 
home full time. 
III.  RATIONAL BASIS PLUS AND DISPARATE IMPACT 
A.  Applying Rational Basis Plus 
The qualifications for the proposed Kansas Care Act would likely elimi-
nate most same-sex families from the potential CARE family pool.  Sec-
tion 1(b)(1) states that  an applicant family must be comprised of a married 
team that has been together for at least seven years.125  However, before the 
Obergefell decision in 2015, which extended the fundamental marriage right 
to same-sex couples, Kansas limited marriage to “two parties who are of the 
opposite sex.”126  While it is possible that some same-sex Kansas partners left 
the state to marry or were married out of state and moved to Kansas in the 
past few years, for the majority of same-sex couples, the CARE Act disqual-
ifies them from participation in the program. 
Unfortunately, however, if an aggrieved same-sex couple challenged the 
Kansas CARE Act, a  federal court would likely rule the law constitutional, 
even under rational basis plus, because of the intent requirement that has 
been inserted into equal protection jurisprudence.  Even under the Court’s 
 
122 As of February 2016, only same-sex couples from four states—Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ver-
mont, and Iowa—would comply with these requirements. State-by-State History of Banning and Legal-
izing Gay Marriage, 1994–2005, PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriageprocon.org/view.re-
source.php?resourceID=004857  (last updated Feb. 16, 2016, 1:44 PM). 
123 See infra Part III.A and accompanying text. 
124  An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(8) 
(Kan. 2015). 
125 Id. § 1(b)(1). 
126 KAN. STAT. § 23-2501 (2014), http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/m/statute/023_000_0000_chap-
ter/023_025_0000_article/023_025_0001_section/023_025_0001_k.pdf. 
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most critical form of rational basis plus review, the plaintiff must still show 
that the challenged legislation is not a legitimate government interest. 
While Senator Knox’s statement may make the CARE Act may seem 
evidently discriminatory, the Supreme Court has made clear that statements 
made by one legislator cannot be used to impute an invidious intent to the 
entire legislative body where there is general silence in the legislative his-
tory.127  Additionally, in Burns v. United States, the Court held that silence can-
not be construed as invidious intent when the textual language does not re-
quire such a conclusion.128 
S.B. 158 was introduced on February 5, 2015 by the Senate Committee 
on Judiciary,129 and aside from one closed hearing, the only legislative evi-
dence would be the original text of the bill,130 which read “a husband and wife 
team married for at least seven years” rather than “a married team.”131  How-
ever, this alone would likely be insufficient to prove animus because, at the 
time of drafting, the state had a law defining marriage as between one man 
and one woman.132  While a plaintiff could argue that this alone is enough to 
show “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,”133 the novelty 
of the Obergefell decision would likely dissuade a tribunal from imputing dis-
criminatory animus to a legislature that amended the law’s problematic lan-
guage after Obergefell made the statute’s language problematic. 
It is also unlikely that Senator Knox’s statements to local Kansas news 
outlets will rise to a constitutionally problematic level.  While his use of words 
like “normal” and “traditional”134 families seem to be an employment of dog-
 
127 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a 
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes 
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); S. Wine and Spirits of America, Inc. v. Div. of 
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an article that 
purports to explain one of the sponsors’ intentions for a particular bill were insufficient to impute 
to the whole). 
128 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991). 
129 SB 158, KSLEGISLATURE.ORG, http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2015_16/measures/sb158/ (last 
visited May 21, 2017). 
130 Id. 
131 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(1) 
(Kan. 2015). As noted previously, this comment amended the original proposed legislation to re-
place the phrase “a husband and wife team” to “a married team” as the legislation was proposed 
before the Obergefell decision. 
132 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2501 (2016). 
133  United States Dep’t of Agr. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
134 See Foster Families, supra note 118; Lowry, supra note 119. 
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whistle politics,135 and his preference for “church people” (which, by the Sen-
ator’s admission, excludes followers of Judaism)136 shows perhaps a personal 
prejudice, those prejudices prove the opinion of only one of several legisla-
tors.  Supreme Court precedent is clear that the opinion of one or two legis-
lators is insufficient to impute a discriminatory intent to an entire assembly,137 
and is therefore unlikely to sway the Court away from its presumed defer-
ence. 
A potential couple would be left with unwinnable arguments to prove a 
discriminatory intent.  While the Care ACT would likely disqualify many 
families who would do an excellent job caring for foster children,138 this is 
insufficient evidence to prove a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.  Both federal and state research groups frequently present data on the 
trauma faced by children in foster care.  If the legislature were to focus its 
priority on the wellbeing of children and incentives to recruit new foster fam-
ilies, as it has done in virtually every summary or commentary by the bill’s 
promoter,139 then there is no legislative evidence to show a desire to harm 
the LGBT community and the constitutional challenge fails.  Because the 
plaintiff cannot prove intent, the constitutional claim fails, as mere disparate 
impact is always insufficient.140 
B.  The Disparate Impact on the Black LGBT Family 
While disparate impact may be insufficient to win a constitutional chal-
lenge, it does not mean that the negative results felt by impacted communities 
are not severe.  Here, the disparate impact felt by the general LGBT com-
munity described above is compounded on Black LGBT couples.  While such 
couples would face the same constitutional barriers as their non-Black peers, 
the proposed law also creates significant hurdles for straight Black citizens, 
and so the effect is compounded for Black LGBTs as members of both 
groups.  To begin, the statute frames the requirements of a CARE family 
 
135 Dog whistle politics is the employment of coded language surrounding political messaging that 
would mean one thing to the general population but has within it embedded, targeted, and often 
hurtful language towards a specific group.  See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE 
POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE 
MIDDLE CLASS (2014). 
136 See Lowry, supra note 119. 
137 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a 
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes 
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”) 
138 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text. 
139 See,e.g., An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess. 
(Kan. 2015).  
140 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977) 
(holding that intent is required to prove an equal protection violation). 
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entirely discount networked families.141  The first criteria of the program re-
quires “a husband and wife”142 couple (likely changed to a general married 
couple after Obergefell), which is reaffirmed by Senator Knox’s desire to recruit 
“normal” families.143  As previously mentioned, this stereotypical framework 
negatively affects a large percentage of Black networked families and the 
community’s cultural trend toward networked family structures.  Happy and 
functional families comprised of non-spousal/extended family units become 
disqualified for the program without adequate consideration of the health of 
the home. 
Furthermore, the seventh criterion of the Act requires that at least one of 
the married adults, “or both, does not work outside the home.”144  Both 
straight and LGBT Black households are statistically more likely to have a 
lower median income, making it less likely that one spouse can remain inside 
the home.145  Many of these families, if not already disqualified by the first 
criterion, would be disqualified by this rule. 
Moreover, the proposed legislation’s eighth criterion has a particular neg-
ative effect on Black LGBT individuals, which requires that the family be 
involved in a social group “larger than the family that meets regularly.”146  
Both the plain language of the text and Senator Knox allude to a desire for 
“churchgoing” people to be involved in the CARE program.147  This presents 
a particularly difficult situation for a Black LGBT person.  While the Black 
community has traditionally revolved around the Church, and while Black 
LGBT people statistically prefer to remain within the Black community, the 
Black Church is often a great opposing force to LGBT equality.148  Out Black 
LGBT people are therefore more likely to be rejected by these institutions 
than their white peers, even as they live and participate in the community.149 
Finally, as previously mentioned, many Black LGBT people feel rejected 
by and reject general LGBT associations, which, as a cyclical problem, are 
commonly dominated by privileged white members of that community.  This 
leads to feelings of tokenism and isolation, which decreases BLGBT partici-
pation, which in turn perpetuates the dominance of white community mem-
bers.  In this way, Black LGBT couples find themselves doubly shunned from 
opportunities to engage in community activities that would qualify them to 
 
141 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(1)–
(8) (Kan. 2015). 
142 Id. § 1(b)(1). 
143 See Lowry, supra note 119. 
144 Id. § 1(b)(7). 
145 See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text. 
146 An Act Concerning the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, S. 158, 2015 Sess., § 1(b)(8). 
147 See Lowry, supra note 119. 
148 See Tonyia M. Rawls, Yes, Jesus Loves Me, in BLACK SEXUALITIES: PROBING POWERS, PASSIONS, 
PRACTICES, AND POLICIES 327 (Juan Battle & Sandra L. Barnes, eds. 2010) (discussing the ostra-
cizing of Black LGBT people by their community and faith). 
149 Id. 
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be CARE parents.  Given the overt and subtle hurdles created for LGBT 
and Black communities within this proposed legislation, the compounded 
negative effects that these criteria would have in allowing Black LGBT fam-
ilies to become CARE families makes it highly unlikely that more than a 
handful of such families would qualify. 
This is not to say that the State does not have a legitimate interest in reg-
ulating who becomes a foster parent—it makes logical sense to have at least 
one parent with a minimum level of education for the benefit of the foster 
child.  There is also a rational basis for desiring a parent to remain in the 
home with the child or children and to encourage adults who are involved in 
the community to become foster parents.  However, the legislation ignores 
cultural differences in certain communities and the general economic realities 
that require both parents to work, and removes otherwise loving potential fos-
ter families from the applicant pool.  A two-parent working household, for 
example, does not result in significant negative impacts on children, and so 
the disproportionately negative impact that these requirements have on the 
certain communities do not seem to outweigh the benefit of diverse foster care 
options, particularly in light of the disproportionately high number of Black 
and LGBT children currently waiting for placement in the foster care system. 
Despite this, the current framework provides no remedy for these fami-
lies.  While a Black LGBT couple may be more likely to feel the discrimina-
tory impact of this law because of its negative effect on both Black and LGBT 
communities, their claim is as sure to fail as their straight Black or white 
LGBT peers.  The CARE Act makes no facial mention of Black people or 
race at all, and both legislative and other secondary sources are devoid of any 
mention of a desire to limit Black Kansans from participating in the Care 
program.  In fact, it is likely that there was no racial animus on the part of 
the Kansas legislators.  Because the legislature did not intend any negative 
impact on the Black community, and because the legislative history does not 
show a consensus desire to harm a politically unpopular group (LGBT peo-
ple), a Black LGBT couple would likely be unable to find remedy through a 
challenge based on either race or sexual orientation. 
IV.  A DIFFERENT TAKE ON EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Kansas CARE program criteria would disproportionately inhibit 
Black LGBT families from enrolling in this advanced foster program while 
still operating within the constitutional bounds of current Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence.  And while it is likely that proportionately greater 
numbers of BLGBT couples would be barred from the program, members 
from both the Black and LGBT communities as a whole would suffer as well.  
How, then, does an in-depth look at the particular Black LGBT subgroup 
add to the discussion or advancement of LGBT equality as a whole? 
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First, by looking at the intersections within any group, politicians, law-
yers, and judges can more precisely identify the costs associated with a par-
ticular piece of legislation to determine if those costs outweigh the benefits 
that the law seeks to attain.  In this instance, an intersectional analysis shows 
that the homes most likely to benefit some of the foster care system’s most 
vulnerable children and teens (Black and LGBT youth) will be dispropor-
tionately rejected by and deterred from the Kansas CARE Program. 
Second, an intersectional analysis highlights the weaknesses inherent in 
the current equal protection framework.  As noted above, cultural and legal 
realities within both the LGBT and Black communities would allow the 
CARE Act to discriminate against these families while remaining constitu-
tional.  The Equal Protection Clause would protect neither group, even 
though the standard of review for LGBT communities is afforded a relatively 
low standard of scrutiny while race is afforded the highest that the Court can 
extend.  Black LGBT families, existing in both worlds, feel this effect more 
acutely, and are as equally without remedy. 
This is a direct result of the intent requirement embedded within each 
level of scrutiny.  From Moreno’s “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group”150 language to the requirement in Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolital Housing Development Corp. that a facially neutral law must be motivated 
by a desire to discriminate against a particular group,151  the Court consist-
ently requires that aggrieved plaintiffs prove that legislators intended to cause 
the resulting disparate harm that plaintiffs have experienced or will experi-
ence if the law is upheld.  Too often, the necessity of concrete “proof” creates 
an insurmountable barrier.152 
Prevailing social science uniformly shows that groups who are distrustful 
of other particular groups do not express that discomfort or dislike through 
overt epithets as they did in the 1960s and 1970s.153  Moreover, enough cases 
have come before courts to put legislators on notice not to include direct 
mentions of a politically unpopular group on the face of the legislation or 
overtly in legislative records.  And, even if a legislator affirmatively advocates 
the harm of a particular group, Supreme Court precedent rejects the notion 
 
150 United States Dep’t of Agr. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
151 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). 
152 Eva Paterson & Susan K. Serrano, Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye: The Supreme Court’s “Intent Doctrine”—
Undermining Viable Discrimination Claims and Remedies for People of Color, in WE DISSENT: TALKING 
BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT 54, 64 (Michael Avery, ed. 2009). 
153 See, e.g., Shana Levin, Social Psychological Evidence on Race and Racism, in COMPELLING INTEREST: 
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 97, 99–
102 (Mitchell J. Chang et. al. eds., 2003) (describing how “traditional” racism has given way to 
three generally new ways of thinking about racism).  See also Paterson & Serrano, supra note 152, at 
64. 
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that a legislator’s active discrimination in the official legislative record can be 
used as proof that the entire lawmaking body intended to discriminate.154 
The statements made by Senator Knox present a perfect example of how 
discriminatory desire is expressed in today’s society.  These statements are 
paradigmatic examples of symbolic prejudice.  Such prejudice expresses neg-
ative feelings towards another group that the speaker believes is in some way 
“violating the traditional values they hold dear.”155  When the Senator re-
marked that “we need normal homes as foster homes. . . . I just mean an 
ordinary home with a mom and dad . . . . It’s no secret I’d like to see church 
people,”156 he never specifically referred to the LGBT community.  How-
ever, these statements unfairly exclude the LGBT community from the norm 
by evoking well-known tensions between the community and those who 
would stereotypically identify as “church people.”  While the dichotomy be-
tween being “gay” and “churchgoing” is false, particularly in the Black 
LGBT community where members generally try to remain in Black commu-
nities highly influenced by the church, the implication of intent remains. 
The implications of the Senator’s statements may be easily understood to 
a reader but are less easily proven to a court.  In all equal protection levels of 
scrutiny, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving the legislator’s intent.  
As lawmakers bear no burden to prove their intent in the first instance, plain-
tiffs will find it increasingly difficult to prove intent through innuendo, partic-
ularly as societial animus evolves to more subtle forms of prejudice. 
Equal protection jurisprudence must advance as expressions of prejudices 
advance.  Legal scholars have for some time been in agreement that some 
change to the equal protection framework is needed, but disagree about the 
form of course correction.157  However, despite the growing body of legal 
scholarship advocating change, it is unlikely that the intent requirement will 
 
154 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one legislator to make a 
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes 
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”); S. Wine and Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of 
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an article that 
purports to explain one of the sponsors’ intentions for a particular bill was insufficient to impute to 
the whole). 
155 See Levin, supra note 153, at 101. 
156 See Lowry, supra note 119. 
157 See, e.g., Sarah Erickson-Muschko, What is the Purpose?  Affirmative Action, DOMA, and the Untenable 
Tiered Framework for Equal Protection Review, 101 GEO. L. J. 44, 45–46 (2013) (highlighting the incon-
sistent rationales for applying different levels of scrutiny to different laws depending upon the con-
text in which the Court hears a case); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481, 482–83 (2004) (critically examining whether the justifications that originally created the 
tiered framework still apply in the modern context); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifi-
cations, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 740–41 (2014) (attempting to resolve the flaw of suspect classi-
fications in the modern tiered framework); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1605, 1608–13 (2015) (arguing for the complete removal of the tiered classification framework 
to a form of heightened scrutiny based on rectifying a history of discrimination towards a particular 
group). 
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ever be entirely abandoned by the Court.  It therefore becomes vital to find 
a way to modernize our conception of what constitutes “intent.” 
There are many ways to solve this problem, but it seems that the simplest 
answer, and perhaps the most effective, is rooted in Professor Henry Cham-
bers’ 2004 article, Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.158  Speaking in the context of race, Professor Chambers asserts that, 
given the malleability of the intent requirement, legislatures should be re-
quired to be aware of the obvious logical consequences that flow from their 
proposed laws and attribute those consequences to the legislature as if it were 
their intent.159  He argues that while the unknowable purpose of the legisla-
ture is not irrelevant, the “presumed intent” inquiry is sensibly structured 
when courts focus on the discriminatory effects that will almost inevitably 
flow from the legislation.160 
This solution is most sensible because it modernizes the courts’ under-
standing of intent while avoiding the inevitable decades of confusion that 
would follow if the Court completely overruled the tiered scrutiny frame-
work.  Instead of confusion, courts could look at readily-available empirical 
evidence of the negative effects that legislation will have on a particular com-
munity as evidence of discrimination.  Finally, and most importantly, courts 
could combat institutional structures of prejudice that evade review. 
Some scholars argue that adequate implementation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires doing away with the tiered scrutiny framework,161 but 
overruling longstanding precedent can have lasting negative effects.  Upend-
ing the entire framework will create massive uncertainty in state and federal 
executive branches, legislatures, and lower courts while an entirely new legal 
framework is created.  It would destroy forty years of precedent and hundreds 
of Supreme Court and State Supreme Court decisions on the contours of the 
right, and would retard the equal protection conversation for years. 
And yet, change seems necessary, and the Court retains the discretion and 
responsibility to overturn unworkable precedent162 or precedent that no longer 
 
158 Professor Henry L. Chambers, Jr., is a constitutional and criminal professor at the University of 
Richmond School of Law. Henry Chambers, Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 13 TEM. POL. & C. R. L. REV. 611 (2004). 
159 Id. at 627. 
160 Id. at 620. 
161 See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739 (2014) 
(attempting to resolve the flaw of suspect classifications in the modern tiered framework); Lauren 
Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1606 (2015) (arguing for the complete removal 
of the tiered classification framework to a form of heightened scrutiny based on rectifying a history 
of discrimination towards a particular group). 
162 Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–65 (1905) (recognizing economic substantive 
due process) with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (overruling Lochner); Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14–19 (1989) (limiting sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth 
Amendment) with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Union 
Gas). 
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comports with current notions of good governance.163  The current standards 
for proving intent meet both criteria.  By maintaining a standard that no longer 
defends against current methods of discrimination, the requirement fails to ef-
fectuate the Amendment’s goals of maintaining equality.  Thus, modifying the 
intent requirement to ease a plaintiff’s burden of proof can allow substantive 
review of constitutionally problematic laws without eliminating the bulk of 
equal protection jurisprudence.  The tiered scrutiny frameworks would re-
main, and a majority of the contours of the right would be preserved. 
The most significant change would be a reworking of Arlington Heights, 
which first explained the burden of intent.164  Arlington Heights instructed lower 
courts to look at specific factors to determine intent, including the “the legis-
lative or administrative history,” which “may be highly relevant, especially 
where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking 
body, minutes of its meetings, or reports,”165 as well as “historical back-
ground” and the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged 
decision.”166  The Court was also clear that “[i]n many instances, to recog-
nize the limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to 
acknowledge the ‘heterogeneity’ of the Nation’s population.”167 
An implied intent requirement modifies the Court’s statements regarding 
disproportionate impact and adds an additional factor for plaintiffs to rely 
upon by allowing them to look at relevant data that was known and readily 
available to legislators at the time of enactment.  For example, with the Kan-
sas CARE Act, because the proposed legislation lists an assortment of criteria 
for applicants, legislators would be expected to know pertinent information 
about groups that would be affected by those criteria.  Legislators would be 
expected to know that LGBT couples in Kansas were formally barred from 
entering into marriages with one another before the Obergefell decision and 
would therefore be disproportionately eliminated.  Similarly, because income 
is a criterion, legislators would be expected to understand the social and ra-
cial statistics surrounding income inequality, and would be held accountable 
for understanding the logical effects of their decisions. 
Critics might argue that legislators could not possibly be aware of every 
data point that could be affected by a particular bill.  The implied intent 
requirement, however, does not require this significant burden.  Rather, it 
requires only that legislators are held accountable for information obviously 
 
163 Compare, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (establishing that “separate but equal” 
comports with the requirements of equal protection) with Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 
483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy). 
164 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). 
165 Id. at 268. 
166 Id. at 267. 
167 Id. at 266 n.15.  See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (rejecting a statistics-based 
theory of discrimination on the grounds that “given the heterogeneity of the Nation’s population” 
the racial composition of any group of government beneficiaries would give rise to an inference of 
discrimination). 
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related to legislation.  As discussed above, marriage equality and income in-
equality are topics that were widely discussed both before and at the time of 
proposal, and legislators cannot in good faith claim ignorance of those ideas.  
Legislators would not be held accountable for other, less apparent, dispro-
portionately negative effects that the law may have.  Instead, the burden 
would fall on groups most likely to be negatively affected to bring these issues 
to the legislators’ attention before the bill is passed.  In this way, the burden 
does not shift to the legislators entirely, but rather shifts a potential plaintiff’s 
burden to an earlier point in time. 
Under a presumed intent framework, intersectional understandings of 
the different groups that would be affected by new legislation would become 
critical and would foster greater interaction between historically marginal-
ized groups and their government.  Because legislators would only be held 
responsible for the obvious consequences of their actions, the legislature itself 
would not have the additional responsibility of conducting in-depth research 
on every possible demographic.  Rather, analyses like the one conducted 
above would be created by interested private-sector parties and presented to 
legislatures to put them on notice of the potential harms of their legislation 
that they may have otherwise overlooked. 
Most importantly, presumed intent would provide relief for plaintiffs who 
are currently underserved by the current equal protection framework.  Black 
LGBT families in Kansas who would be disproportionately rejected from 
foster programs like the Kansas CARE program would have the ability to 
present their unique situation and highlight the bill’s unfair negative effects 
on both them and the larger Black and LGBT communities to a legislature 
whose intent can be inferred by what it knew about its constituents, and could 
do so without fighting decades of Supreme Court precedent that imposes 
unwinnable hurdles for intent. 
CONCLUSION 
Many scholars argue the merits of extending heightened scrutiny to the 
LGBT community with varying degrees of success.  These analyses are often 
conducted using the LGBT community as a whole to define the situation of 
the class.  However, by analyzing judicial precedent through an intersec-
tional framework, it becomes clear that the extension of heightened scrutiny 
may not provide the protection desired.  Rather, one can see that the out-
moded intent requirement embedded in equal protection jurisprudence 
would continue to pose problems even if heightened scrutiny is extended.  
Scholars, lawmakers, and judges should focus first on modernizing the intent 
requirement to more accurately reflect the ways in which animus is currently 
conveyed by both legislators and society. 
